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In compliance with Section 124 of the National Defense
Act of 1916, 39 Stat 915 (5o U.S.C.A. Sec. 79), the United
States Government acquired certain properties in the vicinity
of Muscle Shoals, Alabama, for the purpose of producing ni-
trates and other war materials. Nitrate plants were constructed,
and in 1926 the properties were unified by the completion of a
large dam on the Tennessee River, called Wilson Dam. Until
the passage of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 48
Stat 58 (i6 U.S.C.A. Sec. 831 et seq.), these Muscle Shoals
,properties stood idle except for the operation of the dam to
improve navigation on the Tennessee River and the generation
of limited quantities of electric energy and the sale thereof to
the Alabama Power Company.
The continued idleness of the Muscle Shoals properties as
a whole and the annual waste of vast quantities of unused power
at Wilson Dam had become a problem of grave concern to Con-
gress. Several bills for public operation met with serious
objection, and no offer for private operation had met with Con-
gressional favor. To prevent the continued partial idleness and
waste of power at Wilson Dam, Congress created by Act, a
corporation designated the Tennessee Valley Authority (here-
inafter called TVA), as a governmental agency for the purposes
and with the powers, "to improve the navigability and to pro-
vide for the flood control of the Tennessee Riveri to provide
for reforestation and the proper use of marginal lands in the
Tennessee Valley; to provide for the agricultural and industrial
development of said valley; to provide for the national defence
by the creation of.a corporation for the operation of government
properties at and near Muscle Shoals in the State of Alabama,
and for other purposes."
LEGISLATION 33
Among the powers conferred upon TVA by the Act was the
power, to produce, distribute and sell electric power. TVA Act,
Sec. 5(1). Congress specifically authorized its agency to con-
vert the water power into electric energy and to sell and trans-
mit it to the various types of purchasers in the surrounding
territory. TVA Act, Sec. IO and I2. It empowered the Au-
thority to make such contracts, as to effectively execute the other
provisions. TVA Act, Sec. 4(d).
In the execution of the provisions of the Act, TVA had
concluded contracts with various corporate persons, giving pref-
erence, in accordance with a policy declared in the Statute, to
municipalities and rural co-operatives. To perform these obli-
gations it was necessary to contract with the Alabama Power
Company, a corporation engaged in the production, transmission
and distribution of electricity. Since this company owned all
transmission lines extending from Wilson Dam, TVA in order
to avoid the duplication of existing transmission facilities con-
cluded such a contract January 4, 1934.
The major provisions of the contract, after the recital of
mutual benefits were: (I) An agreement by the Alabama
Power Company to sell to the TVA certain transmission lines
extending from the Government owned Wilson Dam to the
surrounding territory in Northwestern Alabama, together with
certain real property in the area known as the Joe Wheeler
Dam Site. The respective properties to be delivered upon re-
quest of the TVA, which agreed to pay the purchase price, ag-
gregating $1,I5O,oo upon delivery. (2) The TVA agreed not
to extend their operations of the direct sale of power beyond the
limits of nine counties in the State of Mississippi; five and one-
half counties in the State of Alabama; and four and one-half
counties in the State of Tennessee. (3) The Alabama Power
Company further agreed that it would offer its distribution sys-
tems within the territory above named for sale to the respective
municipalities in which such systems are located, at prices which
it was willing to accept. (4) The TVA after waiting three
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months for the negotiation and consummation of sales of the
urban distribution systems, was to have the right to furnish
electric power to any and all such systems, regardless of whether
the Alabama Power Company had sold them to the munici-
palities.
On September 13, 1934, George Ashwander et al, minority
of the preferred stockholders of the Alabama Power Company,
brought suit to enjoin performance of the above-mentioned
contract, after they had formally but unsuccessfully demanded
that the Company itself institute suit to rescind the contract.
An action was commenced in Circuit Court of Limestone Coun-
ty, Alabama, and was later removed to the District Court, N.D.
Alabama, upon petition of the TVA.
The District Judge made the following, among other find-
ings of fact: It is not the purpose of TVA to limit the produc-
tion of electric power to that needed by the Government in
manufacturing war materials and providing for navigation, but
its declared policy is to utilize to the fullest extent possible all
the electric enegry which the Wilson and other dams are capable
of producing; by producing first, governmental needs and then
by selling the surplus to users of electricity, in competition with
public utility corporations engaged in the manufacture, trans-
mission, and distribution of electricity. In disposing of surplus
power the TVA intends to obtain revenue, but at the same time
to undersell its private competitors in order to establish a
"power yardstick," and to demonstrate the advantages of public
over private ownership of electric light plants.
Upon these findings (which the Circuit Court of Appeals
assumed to be correct since none of them were challenged),
the District Court concluded as a matter of law, that Congress
had no Constitutional power to confer upon the TVA, or any
federal agency, the right to enter into such a contract, and since
void as to the TVA, it was void also to the Alabama Power
Company. It was the view of the District Judge that the TVA,
while it had the implied right to dispose of any surplus power
unintentionally created in the exercise of a bona fide effort to
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make such power only as was needed for the manufacture of
war materials and for serving the necessities of navigation, had
and could have no constitutional authority intentionally to create
and sell any additional surplus. The Court therefore enjoined
further performance of the contract of January 4, 1934, Ash-
wander, et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al., 9 Fed. Supp.
965 (193s).
It was the contention of the TVA, in an appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, that as an agency of the United
States it had the constitutional right and statutory authority to
dispose of all electric power, in excess of such of it as may be
needed from time to time for the production of war materials
and for purposes of navigation, that the Wilson Dam operated
to its full capacity could be made to produce.
The arguments and citations in support of such contention
are as follows:
I. The statutory authority of the TVA to acquire transmis-
sion lines, to produce, distribute and sell electric power, is
express and dear. Particularly, Sections Io, I I, and 12, of the
TVA Act, supra, were conceived and adopted for the purpose
of a larger utilization and operation of the Muscle Shoals prop-
erties.
II. The authorization of the TVA, by Congress, to acquire
transmission lines to facilitate the sale of electric energy avail-
able at Wilson Dam is constitutional under the commerce clause
of the Constitution. The Federal Government is authorized to
conserve, protect, and improve navigable waters of the United
States. Ever since the historic decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. I (824), the Supreme Court has consistently given a
liberal interpretation to the commerce power in order to main-
tain the navigable waters of the United States. United States v.
Rio Grande, 174 U.S. 690 (i899)5 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179
U.S. i4i (i9oo); Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379 (1877).
In the course of this power, it became apparent that the protec-
tion and improvement of navigation is physically, functionally
and economically related to other phases of water use and con-
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trol; such as flood control, Jackson v. U.S., 230 U.S. 1 (1913);
watershed protection, U.S. v. Griffin, 58 F. (2d) 674 (W.D.Va.
1932); irrigation, Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (193).
As each of these problems has arisen, the federal commerce
power has been invoked to act affirmatively in certain of these
fields in aid of navigation.
The generation, transmission and sale of electric energy
made available by the construction and operation of a naviga-
tion dam is a reasonable incident of the exercise of the power of
the Federal Government over navigable waters. Green Bay and
Mississippi Canal Company v. Patten Paper Company, 172
U.S. 58 (1898). The right to dispose of the incidental power
was confirmed in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Company, 229 U.S. 53 (1913)-
III. The generation, transmission and sale of surplus electric
energy created at Wilson Dam is authorized under the "war
powers" of Congress (Article I, Sec. 8, sub-sec. 1, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15 and 16, of the Constitution of the United States). Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 3 16 (1819), in upholding the
constitutionality of national banks. United States v. Gettysburg
Electric R. R. Co., 16o U.S. 668 (1896), it was not required
that the measure be indispensable in order to place it within the
"necessary and proper" category.
IV. The generation, transmission and sale of surplus electric
energy at Wilson Dam is within the powers conferred upon the
Congress by clause 2 of Sec. 3 of Article 4 of the Constitution,
which provides: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the ter-
ritory or other property belonging to the United States; * *
This provision contains no limitations in terms, and the decisions
of the Supreme Court establish: first, that Congress has unlim-
ited authority to dispose of the public property. In United States
v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526 (1840), the Court rejected the conten-
tion that the power to dispose included only the power to sell
the fee, but not the power to lease the use, of public lands. See
also Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,
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at 404 (19 17); Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 1O4, at Io6 (i918)i
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (I897); Light v.
United States, 220 U.S. 523 (191 ). Second, the cases dem-
onstrate that Congress may adopt all reasonable means to pro-
mote its chosen policy relating to Government property, Ruddy
v. Rossi, supra; Camfield v. United States, supra; McKelvey v.
United States, 26o U.S. 353 (1922) 5 United States v. Alford,
274 U.S. 264 (1927). It is plain that the water power neces-
sarily created as a by-product, by the construction of a naviga-
tion dam is the property of the United States. In Kaukauna
Water Power Co. v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co., 142
U.S. 254 (I89I), it was held that water power created by
construction of a government dam belongs to the government.
Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co.,
supra. And the conversion of water power into electric energy
and the transmission of such energy to the market for sale are
reasonable means of disposing of Government-owned power.
Ruddy v. Rossi, supra; Camfield v. United States, supra; Van
Lear v. Eisele, 126 Fed. 823 (1903). It may dispose of the
power in order to avoid waste, or to liquidate the cost of the
dam, or to make a widespread distribution of the benefits of
the power.
V. The contention that the TVA is engaged in a "proprietary
business" beyond the power of the National Government, was
answered by the citation of the following cases. There is noth-
ing express in the Constitution about the National Government
engaging in a proprietary business, any more than there is about
creating corporations to conduct a banking business, McCulloch
v. Maryland, supra; First National Bank v. Fellows ex rel.
Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416 (1917); Smith v. Kansas City
Trust Co., 255 U.S. I8o (1921). In United States v. Gratiot,
supra, it was held over objections on the ground of its being a
proprietary business, that the Government could lease lead
mines. In King County v. United States Shipping-Board
Emergency Fleet Corp., 282 Fed. 95o (C.C.A. 9th, 1922), and
Sloan Ship Yards v. United States, 272 Fed. 132 (1921), the
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constitutionality of the establishment, ownership and operation
of merchant ships was upheld. In New Brunswcick v. United
States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928), the constitutionality of the United
States Housing Corporation was assumed. By Act of August
24, 1912, 37 Stat. 557, the Parcel Post was established and its
validity has been unchallenged. The mere fact that one of the
incidental results of the exercise of such a constitutional power
is a governmental activity in a field more commonly occupied
by private corporations is not a reason for denying the existence
of the power; a fortiori when the field is frequently occupied
by other public agencies. The conduct of business in competition
with the private interests may, of course, be for a public pur-
pose. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Illinois, 114 Neb. 243, 207
N.W. 172, 275 U.S. 504 (1927). Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union, 275 U.S. 415
(1928), said, "It is no constitutional objection to its existence
or to its exercise that the property or contracts of individuals
may be incidentally affected." Juilliard v. Greenman, IO U.S.
421 (1884).
VI. The TVA contended that there is no unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power in the sections of the Act relating to,
the construction and operation of dams, the generation and sale
of electric energy, and the acquisition of transmission lines. The
TVA declared, that the case at bar is unlike the cases of Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935) and United
States v. Schecter, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (193 5). The Supreme Court
held in both cases that the delegation provisions were uncon-
stitutional because standards and policies laid down by Congress
for the guidance of the administration agencies were not definite
and dear, and permitted such agencies to determine their own
policies and standards for the laying down of rules. By the
TVA Act, Congress has not attempted to authorize the TVA to
lay down any rules of conduct for persons. The Act conferred
no power upon the Board of Directors to make any laws or
rules. It simply authorized the TVA to do certain acts "in
execution of the Act of Congress." Union Bridge Co. v. United
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States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Ryan v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rail-
road Co., 59 F(2d) 137 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1932)5 Louisville Bridge
Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
The Circuit Court of Appeals, taking cognizance of the con-
tentions of the TVA concluded as a whole that the decree of
the District Court was erroneous. The Court held, that the
United States by virtue of lawful ownership of Wilson Dam,
owns also the water power inevitably created by the dam.
National Defence Act of 1916, supra. Under the constitutional
power to dispose of property belonging to the United States,
Congress may dispose of surplus water power created at Wilson
Dam, and the right of disposal is not limited to that part of the
power accidentally produced in excess of the amount strictly
necessary for national defence or navigation purposes, and the
proceeds may be applied toward reimbursement of the cost of
the dam. It is held, not beyond the power of Congress or of
the TVA as not being reasonably or substantially related to war
and commerce powers conferred on Congress. It may adopt any
reasonable means, whether of lease, or sale for disposition of
surplus power produced at Wilson Dam, owned by the United
States. The Federal Government, although it may not engage
at will in private business, may sell property it owns even if in
so doing it competes with other public or private property
owners.
The contract by the TVA to purchase private power com-
pany transmission lines to convey surplus electrical energy is
not invalid or ultra vires the Authority, as not unreasonably
related to the exercise of war and commerce powers, * * * since
the Government has the right to dispose of all excess power and
use of transmission lines to facilitate sales was not unreasonable
or inappropriate to that end. The TVA generation, transmis-
sion and sale of electric energy is therefore held within the
statutory and constitutional power of the Authority. Tennessee
Valley Authority, et al. v. Ashwander, 78 F.(2d) 578 (1935).
The issue is raised. The statutory and constitutional power
of the Tennessee Valley Authority to execute the contract en-
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joined now rests upon the construction and interpretation by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The court, in its opinion, may take one of several positions.
It may deal specifically with the contract and declare it negatory
as ultra vires the Authority. It may hold that Congress has no
right to delegate such specific powers in the Act, and therefore,
the latter is unconstitutional as to those sections involved.
United States v. Schecter, supra. The court may declare the
Act unconstitutional on the ground that the creating and selling
of power far beyond the necessities of inter-state commerce'or
war could not be justified as a legitimate exercise of these pow-
ers, or of the power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the territory or other property be-
longing to the United States; that it was in reality not an exer-
cise of these powers, but an unwarranted invasion of a field of
legislation reserved to the States.
Or the Supreme Court may affirm the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals: that there has been no unconstitutional dele-
gation of power; that the Tennessee Valley Authority has not
exceeded its statutory authority; and that the creation and sell-
ing of power is a power legitimately derived from the granted
powers named above.
